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Irish voters are about to go to the polls for a second time to decide the fate 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. On 2 October the outcome of the referendum will 
determine whether or not the EU, after eight years of debate and numer-
ous false starts, can finally adopt a new basic treaty. What are the 
chances of success? Here are a brief look at the ratification process, the 
mood in Ireland, and the consequences of the economic crisis–and five 
scenarios of what might happen if there is another No vote. 
I 
Ratification Overview 
The Treaty of Lisbon can enter into force 
only after it has been ratified by all of the 
27 EU member states. In the meantime 23 
countries have given it their assent. In 
Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic 
both houses of parliament have voted in 
favour of acceptance. In order to complete 
the procedural formalities, the heads of 
state merely have to append their signa-
tures to the ratification documents. How-
ever, this still leaves us with Ireland. 
 
In the case of Germany, President Horst 
Köhler, in the wake of the ruling by the 
German Constitutional Court on the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the legislative amendments 
introduced during the summer months, 
may soon pick up his pen and sign on the 
dotted line. Similarly, his Polish counter-
part Lech Kaczynski, despite his funda-
mentally euro-sceptical stance, will also 
sign the reform treaty if the other 26 EU 
states are all on board.  
 
However, the situation in the Czech Re-
public is rather different. Czech President 
Václav Klaus seizes every possible oppor-
tunity to castigate the EU and avails him-
self of legal ruses to prevent further deep-
ening of any kind. Although in May the 
Czech Senate followed the example of the 
house of deputies and finally gave its as-
sent to ratification, self-appointed “EU dis-
sident” Klaus sees no reason why he needs 
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to be in a hurry. Support for his tactical 
procrastination comes from some members 
of his ODS party, who are planning to file 
a second constitutional appeal against the 
Treaty of Lisbon. However, it is difficult to 
imagine that at a second hearing the 
judges of the Constitutional Court in Brno 
would reach a decision which differs from
their ruling in November 2008, when 
they declared that certain controversial 
clauses in the treaty were consonant with 
the Czech Constitution. 
 
All the same, if the Czech president man-
ages to delay the ratification process until 
the British General Election in May or 
June 2010, the treaty could still end up 
on the scrapheap. David Cameron, the 
leader of the euro-sceptic Conservatives, 
has already announced that if they win 
the election (which seems probable), he 
will rescind British approval and have a 
referendum on the subject. That would be 
tantamount to a death blow for the reform 
treaty.  
 
Yet for the moment the ball is back in the 
Irish court. If in the forthcoming referen-
dum the Irish electorate gives its assent 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, then the chances 
that the new primary law will enter into 
force will be very good indeed. 
 
II 
Rejection and Negotiation 
In the referendum on 12 June 2008 Irish 
voters either rejected the Treaty of Lisbon 
or abstained because they did not know 
enough about what it actually meant and 
felt they had not been properly informed. 
The most important reasons why people 
voted No were widespread fears concern-
ing the loss of workers’ rights, the sur-
reptitious militarization of Ireland, and 
what seemed to be apparent threats to the 
restrictive Irish abortion laws. Nor were 
the Irish very happy about the envisaged 
reduction in the size of the Commission. 
Ireland simply insisted on having its own 
EU Commissioner.  
For this reason the Irish government, in 
the wake of the first abortive referendum, 
entered into negotiations and secured a 
series of legal guarantees. At the EU 
summit on 18-19 June 2009 Prime Minis-
ter Brian Cowen came up with a declara-
tion which was designed to deal with the 
The European Council made it clear that 
Ireland’s strict abortion laws would not be 
affected by the Treaty of Lisbon if and 
when it entered into force, nor would its 
right to levy taxes and its traditional pol-
icy of military neutrality. Furthermore, in 
future every member state would still be 
Irish electorate’s principal reservations. 
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able to nominate its own EU Commis-
sioner. 
 
In
a “Solemn Declaration on Workers’ Rights, 
Social Policy and other issues” which, 
without express reference to Ireland, em-
phasized the great importance that the EU 
attaches to social questions. 
 
B
procedure in the other member states will 
not have to go back to square one. The de-
cision of the heads of state and govern-
ment is legally binding and comes into ef-
fect the day the Treaty of Lisbon enters 
into force. And in order to ensure that the 
guarantees have full Treaty status, they 
will be attached as a protocol to the Treaty 
of Lisbon after the ratification of the next 
accession treaty (presumably with Croatia 
in 2010 or 2011). 
 
III 
Economic Crisis 
In the economic and fi is the 
he Irish banks in particular continue to 
he dramatic budgetary situation is caus-
arge parts of the electorate were outraged 
n the other hand the economic and finan-
nancial cris
erstwhile “Celtic tiger” is suffering from a 
bout of the blues. In the final analysis the 
factors which were behind the Irish eco-
nomic boom are the ones which have re-
vealed their downside in the crisis and are 
helping to accelerate the decline. They in-
clude close ties with the crisis-ridden US 
economy, the high level of dependence on 
foreign direct investment, the strain 
placed on an export-based economy by the 
euro exchange rate, and the bursting 
property bubble with its ramifications for 
the financial and construction sectors. 94 
percent of the Irish believe that the 
economic situation of their country is bad 
and no more than 17 percent think that 
the domestic economy will pick up mo-
mentum in the year ahead. 
 
T
be affected by what is going on. In Sep-
tember 2008 the government announced a 
total guarantee of bank deposits amount-
ing to €400 billion, and at the beginning of 
the year it was forced to provide support 
for the two largest banks in the country 
(Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Banks) in the 
shape of a financial injection in the dou-
ble-digit billion range and to nationalize 
the Anglo Irish Bank. In April 2009 plans 
for the establishment of a state-owned 
“Bad Bank” were announced in Dublin. Its 
controversial structure is currently one of 
the biggest political bones of contention in 
Ireland. The opposition parties have an-
nounced that they intend to resist the 
measure during the legislative proceed-
ings which are now getting under way. 
 
T
ing some concern, since it makes it impos-
sible to implement a state-funded eco-
nomic stimulus package for the domestic 
economy. There is growing pressure on 
the government, after it has spent billions 
on measures designed to prop up the 
banks, to stop state finances from getting 
out of hand. The government of Prime Min-
ister Brian Cowen has established two 
commissions of experts, and these have 
suggested comprehensive spending cuts. 
7,000 jobs in the public sectors are to be 
axed; there are to be cuts in the educa-
tional, health and social sectors; and there 
will be new taxes and levies on property, 
water and child allowances. 
 
L
by these proposals. The fact that the gov-
ernment initiated the debate about its con-
troversial cost-cutting and taxation plans 
shortly before the referendum completely 
defies all political logic. The result could 
be a protest vote against the unpopular 
ruling coalition of the conservative Fianna 
Fáil party and the Greens. According to re-
cent surveys 75 percent of the Irish elec-
torate are in favour of a change of gov-
ernment and early elections to the lower 
house, which are actually due to take place 
only in 2012. In opinion polls the govern-
ing coalition manages to get only a hu-
miliating 20 percent approval rating. 
 
O
cial crisis might actually help to persuade 
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the Irish electorate to give its assent to the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Now more than ever the 
islanders believe that the EU is a safe ha-
ven which offers a place of refuge from the 
tempestuous blasts of the global economy. 
44 percent of the Irish are convinced that 
the euro has taken the edge off the nega-
tive effects of the current crisis. Only 30 
percent believe that Ireland would have 
been better off with the Irish pound or 
punt Éireannach. 
 
In
to be one of the member states whose citi-
zens have the most positive attitude to-
wards European integration. On the basis 
of the data provided by the most recent 
Eurobarometer, 69 percent of the Irish–in 
contrast to the EU average of 53 percent–
believe that their country’s membership of 
the EU is “a good thing.” As many as 79 
percent are convinced that Ireland benefits 
from its membership of the EU. 
 
H
shown that positive approval ratings do 
not necessarily lead to a corresponding re-
sult at the ballot box. It seems that in Ire-
land the EU has a large number of “soft 
supporters.” They are, it is true, basically 
pro-European, but do not vote unless they 
are encouraged to do so, and may even 
cast a No vote. 
 
IV 
Campaign 
Since the beginning of  the polls 
 addition to the large governing and op-
wo pro-Lisbon campaigns from the busi-
he No camp comprises a very diverse 
he No camp has received staunch support 
the year
have shown repeatedly that the supporters 
of the treaty are in the majority. In the 
middle of September nearly two-thirds of 
the Irish said that they would be voting 
Yes in the referendum. A crucial differ-
ence to the previous poll could be that the 
number of undecided voters is at about 20 
percent, which is fairly low, and that the 
mobilization of treaty supporters seems to 
be proceeding more smoothly. Further-
more, the current polls seem to suggest 
that the informational campaign being 
mounted by the Yes camp is at last bear-
ing fruit. 60% of the voters and thus a ma-
jority of the Irish electorate now state that 
they understand what the Treaty of Lisbon 
is all about. 
 
In
position parties the most important figures 
in the Yes camp are numerous new civil 
society and business community actors. 
The supporters of the treaty now have far 
more clout and are better prepared to 
reach out to target groups than they were 
back in 2008. The new actors include 
Ireland for Europe, which is led by Pat 
Cox, the former President of the European 
Parliament and President of the European 
Movement, who has attracted the support 
of celebrities from show business, sport 
and the business world. We Belong and 
Generation Yes are trying to appeal in par-
ticular to young voters who mainly voted 
No at the previous referendum. 
 
T
ness community are of some interest. Mi-
chael O’Leary, the head of Ryanair, is on 
record as saying that he does not want to 
have to rely on “incompetent” politicians. 
The support given by Intel is especially 
symbolic, for in May 2009 the EU Com-
mission imposed a record fine of €1.06 bil-
lion on the company on account of its 
abuse of its market power and distortion of 
competition. 
 
T
mixture of groups from the right and left 
rims of the political spectrum. However, 
on this occasion the No campaign lacks a 
face, a voice and indeed the requisite 
funding. This is above all due to the fact 
that the anti-Lisbon movement Libertas 
has for the time being withdrawn from the 
fray in the wake of its dismal performance 
at the European elections. In the meantime 
its leader, Declan Ganley, has made a 
comeback, but the mobilizing effect has 
remained small.  
 
T
from the euro-sceptics of the British UK 
Independence Party, which as a result of 
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its success at the European elections now 
has 13 MEPs in the European Parliament. 
The UKIP has sent 1.5 million brochures 
entitled “The Truth about the Treaty of 
Lisbon” to Irish households in which it 
claims, for example, that the Treaty would 
lead to a mass influx of immigrants from 
Turkey. Yet the involvement of the UKIP is 
actually to the benefit of the Yes camp, 
which promptly denounced its campaign 
as being anti-Irish. Do Irishmen and Irish-
women really want to be told what to do, 
especially by their British neighbours? 
 
P
No camp is the conservative Roman Catho-
lic organization Cóir, which has attracted a 
great deal of attention on account of its 
provocative poster campaign. Its principal 
tion, euthanasia and stem cell research. 
The opponents of the treaty also include 
Sinn Féin, the Socialist Party and “Cam-
paign against the EU Constitution,” an 
umbrella organization of 15 left-wing 
groups. 
Whereas the Yes camp has come up with 
slogans 
such as “Ireland needs Europe” (Fianna 
Fáil) or “Yes to Recovery, Yes to Europe” 
(Fine Gael), the opponents of Lisbon have 
once again plumped for a fear-ridden cam-
paign based on distorted facts and un-
truths. Their posters and their pithy and 
emotionally charged messages are in-
tended to exacerbate Irish fears about a 
loss of freedom, influence and money. Yet 
the thrust of the debate has changed. In 
the light of the guarantees secured by the 
government the warnings about a Europe-
wide harmonization of taxes, a liberaliza-
tion of abortion laws and a militarization 
of Ireland no longer seem as terrifying as 
they did a year ago. For this reason the 
opponents of Lisbon have homed in on a 
new topic, the supposed undermin-
ing of workers’ rights by the EU’s 
neo-liberal economic policies. 
 
Yet this time round the Yes camp is
m
lies and distortions of the truth. The 
supporters of Lisbon have learned 
from their luckless campaign a year 
ago that half-truths can only be 
countered with a campaign which 
systematically sets out the facts. 
Leading politicians, journalists and 
internet fact checks have displayed 
remarkable resolve in demonstrat-
ing that the arguments of the oppo-
nents of the treaty are untenable 
and incorrect. But in addition to the 
professionalization of its public rela-
tions work, the Yes campaign has 
changed from relying on the media 
(“air war”) and is now a street cam-
paign with house-to-house canvass-
ing (“ground war”). 
 
However, there cont
dtopics are ethical questions such as abor-
pporters of the treaty still find it dif-
ficult to say why anyone should actually 
give his or her assent to its complex pro-
visions. The arguments are still centred on 
the notional costs of a No vote–which in-
clude the isolation of Ireland in the EU, 
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the exodus of foreign direct investments, 
the exacerbation of the economic crisis, 
etc.–instead of asking for a heartfelt Yes. 
 
V 
A No vote after all?  
Everything mmingly. 
So it is hardly surprising that Brussels has 
 repeated yet 
gain. In this scenario the Treaty of Lis-
b
ame plans of this kind should 
e nipped in the bud at the earliest possi-
the EU member states decide to 
ave a new treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon is 
mple, which agreed very reluctantly to 
leaves the EU. Numerous 
uropean politicians, at least in a discreet 
tions do 
ot explicitly provide for a member state 
Five scenarios 
 seems to be going swi
once again been overwhelmed by its abil-
ity to repress unwelcome facts. Yet what 
in fact will happen if the Irish reject the 
Treaty of Lisbon a second time? It is possi-
ble to imagine five scenarios, though they 
are not all equally probable. 
 
First, the referendum will be
a
on, much to the chagrin of all concerned, 
would be put to one side, and then, in two 
or three years’ time, would be presented 
once again to the Irish electorate. The 
other EU member states would emphasize 
that nothing had changed with regard to 
the need for a new basic treaty. In fact, it 
was needed more than ever, and for this 
reason the Irish would be asked to approve 
its adoption in 2011 or 2012. What ini-
tially might seem either fanciful or totally 
absurd could in practice be presented by 
the supporters of such an option as a last-
ditch opportunity to move ahead with in-
tegration. 
 
However, g
b
ble opportunity. The basic point, which is 
made not only by EU sceptics, is that one 
cannot let the electorate keep on voting 
until one gets the result one wants to 
have. In the final analysis what is at issue 
is nothing less than the democratic credi-
bility of the European Union. So if the 
Irish were in fact to reject the Treaty of 
Lisbon a second time round, the heads of 
state and  government should definitely 
exclude a third referendum. 
 
 
Second, 
h
taken to pieces and completely renegoti-
ated. The basis for such a procedure would 
be general agreement that the EU 27 is no 
longer governable with the Treaty of Nice. 
However, even if the heads of state and 
government were to come jointly to this 
conclusion, there would in practice be a 
host of virtually insurmountable obstacles. 
 
EU states such as Italy or Belgium, for ex-
a
the emasculation of the original constitu-
tional treaty would probably object vehe-
mently against any further deceleration in 
the integration process. On the other hand, 
on account of changes in the domestic and 
general European political landscape, the 
Czech Republic and above all the United 
Kingdom might even use such treaty nego-
tiations to bring about a total reversal of 
European integration policy. From now on 
the idea might be to work for less integra-
tion, and not for more. The risk that the 
EU, as a result of such discussions, might 
be drawn deeper and deeper into a crisis-
ridden maelstrom is greater than if it did 
nothing at all. 
 
Third, Ireland 
E
kind of way, emphasized that this scenario 
was a distinct possibility after the Irish No 
vote in the first referendum. Anyone who 
objects twice to an important European 
document that points the way ahead, so 
the reasoning goes, cannot continue to be 
a member of the European Union. 
 
Even if the current treaty regula
n
to leave the EU, Ireland can take this step 
at any time. In the final analysis the Union 
is based on international treaties which 
can be revoked at any time. But could Ire-
land be forced to leave the EU so that the 
other states can continue with the ratifica-
tion process? No, it could not. This would 
be possible neither from a European nor 
from an international law point of view. 
And in political terms it would deal a 
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tice there is 
t the moment hardly a single national 
 
 
st but not least, this step in particular 
ould alienate EU citizens even more from 
y of Nice remains in force 
nd a few small changes are introduced. 
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death blow to the European spirit. How 
could policymakers tell EU citizens that 
they were serious about wanting to make 
the EU more democratic with the help of 
the Treaty of Lisbon if they decided to ig-
nore the way a whole nation voted and in 
the final analysis were willing to punish 
the country concerned? 
www.ratification-monitor.eu
 
Fourth, the creation of a 
ti
countries in the EU could use an Irish No 
vote as the cue to create a new institu-
tional structure outside of the EU frame-
work. By building on the contents of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, they would implement 
their ideas of increasingly close coopera-
tion between European states. 
 
So much for the theory. In prac
a
government in Europe which has the 
strength to throw national competences 
overboard in order to assign them to a 
higher level. This applies especially to 
German policymakers, whose hands are 
tied as a result of the Lisbon ruling of the 
German Constitutional Court. Further-
more, the political staff which might strive 
for such integration in a decisive and reso-
lute manner simply does not exist. And,  
 
la
w
the European project. In economically dif-
ficult times Europeans do not have a lot of 
time  for quarrelling and petty discussions 
about a treaty. 
 
Fifth, the Treat
a
Contrary to the official rhetoric surround-
ing the treaty, in recent months some 
slight doubts have in fact been voiced in 
Brussels. The changes envisaged by the 
Treaty of Lisbon signify progress as far as 
the European elite is concerned, though in 
many respects the actual consequences 
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are neither predictable nor have they been 
properly scrutinized. In the final analysis 
no one knows, for example, how the newly 
created offices or the incumbents will get 
on with one another. Yes, it would be per-
fectly possible to soldier on with the 
Treaty of Nice. 
 
In fact the legis
s
sis of the Treaty of Nice. Even changes in 
the institutional structure would be a pos-
sibility, though they would be onerous to 
implement. Thus it would be possible to 
establish both the office of a European 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Euro-
pean External Action Service. No new trea-
ties are required for this purpose, merely 
the requisite political will. If Europe’s poli-
ticians are really serious about embarking 
on more democracy, then they could also 
create a European right of initiative with-
out waiting to include such provisions in a 
treaty. Thus in practical terms policymak-
ers in Brussels could show by means of in-
ter-institutional agreements between vari-
ous EU bodies and simple changes in the 
rules of procedure that they actually mean 
what they say when they hold out the 
promise of more democracy in the EU. 
 
 
In
most probable option, the EU would be-
come even more differentiated internally. 
The countries which wish to work together 
more closely in certain policy areas would 
be able to do so on the lines of “enhanced 
cooperation,” which has often been propa-
gated but never tried out in practice. How-
ever, it is also clear that all this would 
spell the end of the political élan and the 
desire to create something new on the 
European level and to increase EU influ-
ence throughout the world. And in fact 
this would be difficult to revive for many 
years to come. 
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